

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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RQM/OIS SUPPORT OF PBSUCCESS

2003

Chronology and Nature of Task

Operational intelligence support for PBSUCCESS was provided beginning May, 1953, when this office was asked for an intensive special study of coffee production in Guatemala with its ramified implications bearing on the total economic and political situation of that country. This was a preparatory investigation laid on by WH Division without revelation to RQM/OIS of any detail of the contemplated operation. The underlying intent of the requirement was implicit, however, in certain terms of reference divulged with regard to the study, and this office consequently prepared a voluntary memorandum of "Special Considerations" which was classified Top Secret and given limited distribution. (Attachments)

The Chief and Deputy Chief of RQM/OIS were briefed on PBSUCCESS on 10 December 1953 by Hans Tofti. They were requested at that time to devote the facilities of this office to support of the project as indicated by DD/P and Chief/WH Division, giving highest priority to this requirement. The two members of the Research Panel specializing in WH affairs were briefed that same day, and other components of RQM/OIS were instructed as necessary to cooperate in meeting special and high priority demands with reference to "the Central American area." From that day until the end of July, 1954, PBSUCCESS requirements demanded a large part of the time.

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of the OIS Chief and his deputies and absorbed more than 100% of the working time of the two Research Panel specialists, who had to put aside all of their other regular assignments in support of WH Division, and in addition worked more than 500 hours overtime on PBSUCCESS. As unforeseen emergencies continued to arise, almost all members of the OIS staff, including other geographic area specialists, were called on for special contributions.

The duties of RQM/OIS in support of PBSUCCESS embraced the following:

1. Coordination with OCI and Staff D

RQM/OIS briefed DAD/CI on 10 December 1953, and thereafter with his cooperation maintained continuing coordination of PBSUCCESS requirements with OCI and STD. This coordination and close cooperation continued for the duration of the operation and into its aftermath. In final stages, STD and OCI also gave direct support on request of DD/P. Certain technical services by STD also were supplied directly, OIS specialists from time to time clearing with or assisting those of STD on background information.

2. Radio Broadcast Monitoring - Coordination with ~~FBS~~ FBIS

OIS between 10-15 December arranged with FBIS for installation of the "C" teletype line direct to LINCOLN and for special monitoring services, supplied a basic target list and briefed the FBIS editorial staff to the extent necessary for establishing firm support of the operation. Coordination with

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FBIS continued throughout the duration of the operation. OIS obtained from FBIS such support data and services as information on radio facilities and reception in the area of concern, and in later stages of the project, special monitoring of Radio Liberacion. FBIS notified OIS when unusual developments were observed, such as temporary cessation of broadcasts, which information was passed on by OIS to responsible officers of PBSUCCESS. Hard copies of "C" line transmissions, not distributed otherwise within the Agency, were picked up by this office in L Building and transmitted with other special materials to PBSUCCESS staff in Barton Hall.

3. Coordination with Contact Division, Cartographic and Photo Interpretation Divisions, and FDD

*Graphographic Registrar*

OIS between 10-15 December briefed Chief/OO, Chief/Cartographic Division,

*Chief/Geography Division*

*Chief/Graphographic Registrar*

*Division*, and Chief/FDD, as necessary and arranged for priority support for

PBSUCCESS from the respective ~~xxxx~~ offices. Throughout the operation, very close liaison was maintained by OIS with these offices, especially the two first named, which were called upon continually up through the final days, for highly specialized contributions, usually under emergency pressure. RQM/OIS was the only channel of communication between staff members was deemed helpful. All PBSUCCESS requirements laid on Contact Division, covering a wide range of delicate ~~xxxx~~ and highly important tasks, passed through this channel,

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~~as did~~ as also did all PBSUCCESS requirements for special cartography, including maps for night use printed on cloth with luminous ink, and all requirements for photo interpretation for parachute drops.

All concerned conscientiously held to channels at all times ~~of~~ and on various occasions satisfaction was expressed by all concerned with the time-saving and efficiency thereby attained. The only instances of confusion occurred when persons newly assigned to PBSUCCESS went out of channels through inexperience. Because the system existed, however, these cases usually were clarified before duplication of effort resulted.

#### 4. Press Clipping Service

Facilities and costs of press coverage were explored with CIA Library and Contact Division immediately on request, in early December. The ~~XX~~ CIA Library press clipping service was established by 15 December. For security reasons, on instruction from PBSUCCESS staff, the clippings were transmitted daily to RQM/OIS and were airmailed from this office to a Post Office box designated by LINCOLN. LINCOLN undertook directly the procurement of foreign press items desired. At a later date, when speed-up and increased scope of coverage were sought, arrangements were made by RQM/OIS through the [ ] Field Office of Contact Division for a commercial press clipping service. This provided daily coverage, airmailed directly to a Post Office Box designated by LINCOLN. Additional ~~xxx~~ clippings from miscellaneous sources also were forwarded to LINCOLN, it has been informally reported, from another office, presumably in WH Division.

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Dissatisfaction arose on the receiving end which declared the press clipping service slow and inadequate. The confusion seems to have been partly due to the fact that the material came in to LINCOLN from several sources and not through a single channel where responsibility could be fixed and clarification of the problem obtained. Time was lost in overcoming the deficiency of the service while RQM/OIS awaited final instructions on which action could be taken to procure the commercial press clipping service. In the meanwhile an informal check on the flow of clippings provided by CIA Library and airmailed as received by OIS, allowing for the unavoidable lag due to the extra step of transit between the Library and this office, showed that the distinctively ~~marked~~ marked envelopes used by OIS had been received regularly at the normal rate for ordinary <sup>air</sup> mail service. The timeliness of the OCD Library clipping service, of course, depended on the speed of delivery to the Library of the 35 newspapers covered, most of which obviously originated outside of Washington. This service probably could have been developed more satisfactorily had OIS pressed for definition of the purpose served ~~by the~~ by the clippings in the operation.

5. Research Reports and Collection of Intelligence Data

OIS procured or produced in support of PBSUCCESS 47 special reports, analyses, and compilations of data, totalling approximately 535 pages. (see attached list). Included were studies on the coffee industry in Guatemala, communism

in Guatemala, Guatemalan efforts to procure arms, and the Caribbean Legion; a definition of the elements of psychological intelligence; data on railroads, electric power, petroleum, basic geography; climatic and meteorological information; economic and financial information and analyses; [ ] and notes; analyses of political situations and group attitudes and of factual evidence bearing on ~~specific~~ specific developments.

#### 6. Psychological Program Support

OIS support of the psychological phase of the operation was impaired by lack of definition as to the extent or limits of support necessary, lack of a clear channel to the responsible head of the psychological operation, and confusion as to the policy and extent of direct procurement of materials by LINCOLN. The general requirement laid on with OIS was vague and extremely broad in scope. Efforts to key in OIS support with the direct acquisition of materials at LINCOLN were unsuccessful. Because of time and emergency pressures it never became possible for OIS to obtain clear knowledge of where other procurement began or ended on what aspects of the general program OIS should focus its effort so as to supplement and not duplicate other undertakings. No clear channel or liaison could be established with the individual primarily responsible for overall planning and conduct of the psychological aspect of PBSUCCESS. This was the only case during the operation in which OIS was unable to carry out its standard practice of working out with the requester a

precise definition of needs, scope and limitation of requirements. While it was made evident that large-scale support along various lines would have been welcomed by PBSUCCESS for purposes of experimentation and improvisation other pressing demands made it out of the question for OIS to undertake the assignment without more precise specification. OIS support was finally limited to obtaining recordings for radio broadcasting purposes, selected experimentally as to type and quantity. LINCOLN's requirement of recordings (without indication of quantity) of "typical Guatemalan marimba music" could not be supplied through normal commercial channels. OIS therefore ultimately arranged through a cleared agent in New York to hire professional musicians and have recordings made at a professional studio, OIS supervising the selection of musical numbers recorded. The cost of obtaining these recordings, which totaled three hours of playing time, was approximately \$800, apart from the cost of liaison and supervision and time and travel expenditures for our search for records from commercial sources.

The recordings were brought to headquarters immediately on completion and were reproduced on tapes by TSS as a precaution against loss or damage and for better technical results in radio broadcasting. TSS gave a priority to this work and the records and a set of tapes were turned over to the Barton Hall office to be sent by air freight to LINCOLN. Through misunderstanding

of shipping instructions or negligence in picking up the shipment at LINCOLN, there was a delay of at least two weeks in the receipt of this material by persons cognizant of the requirement. OIS was informed in the course of operation that a library of recordings was being acquired directly at LINCOLN. The extent of duplication of effort or cost that may have occurred is unknown. After termination of the operation OIS was informed that typical regional music had been picked up from a Honduran night club and used for rebroadcasting. ~~Web~~ Whether this rendered superfluous the special procurement of recordings in New York is unknown.

Doubtless there was fault by omission on both sides in this case. The main deficiency, however, appears to have been rooted in lack of advance planning of the psychological program in sufficient detail of outline so that support requirements could be described in concrete terms and quantities.

#### 7. Coordination with Departments of State and Defense

a. At the request of WH Division, OIS worked intensively on the preparation of support materials for the American Delegation at the Xth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, 1 March 1954. As the Conference became largely concerned with the question of communism in Guatemala, this task was considered as a phase of PBSUCCESS support. OIS staff members produced a considerable volume of research and presentation, including text and charts, and carried out the coordination of State ARA and OIR contributions with CIA production, as well as most of the editing, typing and all of the work of



reproduction and assembling of the main American documentary exhibit and reference paper, under the title of "Communism in Guatemala" (150 pages). Contributions to this study were obtained from CENIS (external research) OCI, ORR, STaff C, and WH Division. OIS arranged for the meetings and conferences necessary to organize and coordinate this work and followed through on the details of final ~~reproduction~~ reproduction as indicated

b. Throughout the remaining period of PBSUCCESS operations, OIS continued liaison with State, ~~both~~ in OIR, <sup>and BI</sup> and ARA, as requested by WH Division and DD/P, <sup>OIL</sup> ~~and~~ represented the Agency ~~interest~~ in meetings of the task force assembled by State Department to prepare the US position papers for the OAS meeting on the Guatemalan case, <sup>which was</sup> scheduled for Montevideo <sup>but</sup> ~~and~~ subsequently cancelled.

c. At request of DD/P, OIS prepared certain data and special reports for briefing the Assistant Sec. of State ~~of~~ for American Republic Affairs and the Undersecretary of Defense. Normal liaison was maintained at all times with the Department of Defense. Special and crash requirements were fulfilled through this liaison on numerous occasions; G-2 cooperated by forwarding for OCI and OIS advance copies of pertinent attache reports as received, as well as all data on the Guatemalan O. B.

8. Timely dissemination of intelligence materials and reproduction service

OIS gave priority treatment to dissemination of all incoming cables and despatches pertaining to the Central American area from December to the end of the operation and into its aftermath. The competent officers and analysts were alerted and promptly supplied with significant incoming materials.

After operational needs led to establishment of a special staff at Barton Hall, apart from WH Division, OIS was called on to meet the problem of providing both the Barton Hall office and LINCOLN with copies of intelligence materials routinely disseminated to WH Division. For security reasons, it was decided not to request additional copies of IAC materials, and arrangements were made with RI/Reproduction for daily priority service on items selected by OIS for Barton Hall and LINCOLN. This service ran to thousands of pages of verifax reproduction. It proved extremely helpful to the offices serviced and was continued to the end of the operation.

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Conclusions and Lessons Learned

RQM/OIS occupied a unique position in relation to PBSUCCESS. While informed of the objectives and course of developments and while laboring under the time pressure and constant emergency demands which characterized the entire operation and <sup>such</sup> concomitant developments ~~was~~ as the Guatemalan case in the OAS, RQM/OIS still was not a direct participant and therefore was able to consider the factors in its purview with a certain amount of objectivity. Periodic recapitulations of OIS commitments were made, support problems were reviewed and notes were kept for the possible benefit to future operations which might follow from lessons learned.

1. A clear, precise definition of the problem, the long range and the immediate objectives, is fundamental for purposes of planning, providing support and carrying out a broad operation. Such definition should take into consideration the desirable effects the operation is intended to produce and the problems it is likely to create. No opening for doubt or misconception should be allowed in the choice of reference terms; if both psychological and paramilitary action is contemplated, the fact should be plainly stated and the preponderance or precedence of one over the other, the limits imposed or possible extent of the action anticipated, should be contained in clear language in the plan. OIS expressed some of its conclusions on <sup>The definition of</sup> ~~this~~ subject <sup>in a</sup> memorandum, "Comment on Guatemala Country Plan," 25 March 1954.

(copy attached).

2. In such an undertaking as PBSUCCESS, "post-operation" country plan

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should be prepared concurrently with the country plan and should be developed

and defined with the same care, skill and background knowledge applied to

devising the operational plan. Major disruptions in the entire nation of

Guatemala were implicit in the plan of PBSUCCESS. Disruption of government

organization, <sup>reimposition of</sup> basic legislation, <sup>disruption</sup> of the army, political parties, labor organizations,

and the economic life of the country. <sup>were unavoidable and foreseeable</sup> The problems of the transitional period <sup>had to be allowed</sup>

should have been anticipated, <sup>should have been fully</sup> a tide-over operation planned, and replacement

personnel <sup>should have been</sup> prepared to carry it out in case of exposures in connection with the

basic operation. For example, PBSUCCESS was focused on elimination of

Communist influence in Guatemala. The means of <sup>establishing</sup> post-operational control <sup>over</sup>

and disposition of high communist leaders, therefore, <sup>should</sup> have been

considered almost as an integral part of the operational plan, certainly as

a post-operational problem for which <sup>planning</sup> agency responsibility could not <sup>be made</sup> abruptly

be resigned. It appears, however, that <sup>no detailed or comprehensive plans</sup> ~~nothing was done~~ in preparation for

this contingency, <sup>made</sup> ~~beyond reckless promises~~ voiced by the operators of Radio

Liberacion to "kill them all." <sup>At one case in point, no</sup> No card file or checklist of the principal

communists in Guatemala of concern to PBSUCCESS was <sup>available in ready form</sup> ~~prepared until~~

on 29 July 1954, at 4:45 p.m., when RQM/OIS was requested to procure such a

list by 2 o'clock the following day. This was after President Arbenz had

resigned, and the list was needed to prevent flight of Communists across the

several Guatemalan frontiers (with Mexico, British Honduras, Honduras and

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El Salvador). ~~No such listing existed at that time.~~ By working most of the

~~night~~ <sup>F</sup> from such sources as were available at the late hour of the request,

a stop-gap listing was completed to meet the deadline. A revision was

issued one week later with the cooperation of WH Division and State BI

<sup>second</sup> after/request on a similar crash basis.

3. A prerequisite for any operation of the scope of PBSUCCESS should

<sup>thorough-going</sup> be a/country study, or series of studies, prepared well in advance of operational activities. Such studies <sup>should include analyses of basic psychological factors</sup> ~~would~~ bring together for ready reference <sup>and</sup> pertinent,

~~detailed~~ <sup>with an extensive biographic reference section</sup> factual data on geographic and climatic conditions; economic, political, military, and social conditions; important historical considerations, and the

characteristic attitudes of groups and influential leaders, These studies

would be additional or supplementary to standard NIS production in that they

would be geared to support a specific operation in the depth necessary.

Such studies would (a) be a useful guide for systematic, and "post-operational" planning, (b) indicate ~~xx~~ at an early stage the gaps in information which could be filled through field collection or other means, (c) protect the security of the operation, and (d) reduce the need for emergency and crash studies.

4. The demands on personnel for high pressure and overtime work, while universally met with cheerfulness and even with zest, raised the cost of PBSUCCESS and led to serious security risks. This could have been to a

considerable extent avoided, had support requirements been analyzed and spelled out in advance.

More orderly and effective support, with less strain and security risk, could have been arranged by OIS, even as late as December, if a thorough study of foreseeable needs had been made <sup>and if</sup> an inventory of assets in the Division and at LINCOLN had been drawn up, ~~and a clarification of the chain of command for the several parts of the operation had been possible.~~ OIS made several efforts at the time to fill the gaps in knowledge of such <sup>factors,</sup> ~~locations,~~ but could not complete them, despite the willingness of WH Division to cooperate in every way, because of the haste with which the operation moved from the planning into the action phase and because of the fact that operations began at LINCOLN before an adequate complementary office was established at headquarters.

5. It was demonstrated in the PBSUCCESS experience that use of the RQM/OIS channel to obtain support materials from sources outside the

Clandestine Services area protects security regarding operational personnel.

*We believe, in the light of this experience, that*  
~~Through this channel, moreover,~~ advance collection of support materials

can be accomplished on a very extensive scale without jeopardizing operational

*if this channel is properly used.*  
security, <sup>Contrary to impressions which prevailed in some quarters early</sup> ~~Contrary to impressions which prevailed in some quarters early~~ <sup>it is not necessary, to blanket specific</sup> ~~in preparations for PBSUCCESS,~~ <sup>Experience also showed that attempts to</sup>

*Requirements under broad general directives, in order to preserve operational security, the main necessity is to avoid arousing abnormal interest by laying on a deluge of crash, rush, and super-priority demands. The main necessity is to*

*The PBSUCCESS experience showed that attempts to*  
cover preliminary investigations (such as study of the Guatemalan coffee  
industry) by giving them excessively high priority <sup>and security</sup> ~~top secret~~ classification,  
tends to stimulate more speculation than does a normal approach as for ~~the~~  
any of the scores of other study requests routinely received in the various  
offices concerned with research in <sup>the intelligence community</sup> ~~CIA and State~~.

*omit.*  
6. A striking aspect of RQM/OIS ~~experience~~ experience in supporting PBSUCCESS  
was gradual discovery that the operation as laid on was disapproved by many  
~~analysts~~ analysts and desk officers in CIA and Department of State. Those  
who held this opinion generally believed in the over-all objective, i. e.  
elimination of Communist influence in Guatemala, but were convinced that  
the method chosen to accomplish the objective would at best return only  
partial and short-term advantages in exchange for grave long-term risks.  
They believed that this operation would fall ~~in~~ considerably short of the result  
desired, would produce new problems, would lead to widespread conviction  
that US direct intervention was responsible for any adverse developments,  
and in the long run <sup>would</sup> have repercussions injurious to US prestige and policy  
objectives throughout the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The analysts  
and officers who expressed these reservations, to the knowledge of RQM/OIS,  
chose one of two courses for their own action: where under obligation to  
work actively in support of the operation they stated their reservations and  
then consciously strove to do everything in ~~their~~ their capacity to promote

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the success of the operation as conceived and ordered; where not under

obligation to work on the project they avoided any connection with it.

*mail*  
The two Research Panel specialists of RQM/OIS shared these opinions

from the outset and chose the first course of action.



SPECIAL STUDIES AND REPORTS PREPARED OR OBTAINED  
BY RQM/OIS FOR PBSUCCESS

SPECIAL STUDIES

Date		No. of Pages *	Prepared by
(1) 5 October 1953	THE COFFEE INDUSTRY IN GUATEMALA	106	RQM/OIS
(2) February 1954	COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA	150	State ARA & RQM/OI (OCI, Sample, 1/1/54)
(3) 25 June 1954	GUATEMALAN PROCUREMENT OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT	22	RQM/OIS
(4) 30 June 1954	CHECKLIST OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS	15	RQM/OIS
(5) 3 July 1954	REVISED CHECKLISTS OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS	32	RQM/OIS, WH Div., State BI

MEMORANDUM REPORTS

(1) 22 Sept 1953	Guatemalan Laws Governing Oil Exploitation	5	RQM/OIS
(2) 23 Sept 1953	"Black Bug" in Coffee Shipments		"
(3) 28 Sept 1953	Guatemalan Armed Forces		"
(4) 28 Sept 1953	Estimate of Current Economic Situation in Guatemala	2	"
(5) 5 October 1953	Data on Import of Coffee Bags		"
(6) October 1953	Iowa State College Facilities in Guatemala		"
(7) 3 Dec 1953	Railroads in Guatemala	8	"
(8) 7 Dec 1953	Salvadoran Requests for Arms	3	OCI
(9) 8 Dec 1953	Railroads and Electric Power Installations in Guatemala	3	RQM/OIS
(10) December 1953	Data on Puerto Arenas		" (oral report)
(11) 15 Dec 1953	Caribbean Legion	1	"
(12) 17 Dec 1953	Essential Elements of Psychological Intelligence (Definition)	5	"
(13) 18 Dec 1953	Outstanding Claims Against Guatemalan Land Expropriations		"
(14) 20 Jan 1954	Caribbean Legion	9	OCI
(15) 26 Jan 1954	Materials for Psychological Warfare with Estimate of Radio and Press Facilities in Guatemala	16	RQM/OIS (Voluntary
(16) 2 Feb 1954	Current Labor Situation in Guatemala	33	" (Voluntary
(17) February 1954	Geography of Guatemala (Basic)	9	ORR (Voluntary)
(18) 5 March 1954	Caribbean Legion-Luperon Landings	8	RQM/OIS

\* Subject matter only, no transmittal memos or charts.

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(19)	March 1954	Seasons in Guatemala	3	ORR
(20)	12 March 1954	Attempts of the Guatemalan Government to Obtain Arms	3	RQM/OIS
(21)	7 May 1954	Analysis of Evidence in Assault on Somoza	12	"
(22)	May 1954	Diaz Itinerary		"
(23)	17 May 1954	Soviet Bloc Importers of Guatemalan Coffee		"
(24)	27 May 1954	Analysis of Sidney Gruson Reports	4	"
(25)	1 June 1954	Petroleum Situation in Guatemala	16	ORR & RQM/OIS
(26)	9 June 1954	Effect on Guatemalan Economy of the Application of Economic Sanctions	4	RQM/OIS
(27)	9 June 1954	International Financial Position of Guatemala	1	"
(28)	10 June 1954	Financial Sanctions Against Guatemala	1	"
(29)	11 June 1954	Guatemalan Newsprint Consumption and Sources		" (oral report)
(30)	14 June 1954	Soviet Aid to Spanish Republics, C Czechoslovakia and Greece	9	"
(31)	14 June 1954	Lassen & Co., German Shipping Firm		"
(32)	15 June 1954	Unfavorable Developments of the Deterioration in Guatemalan Financial and Fiscal Situation	1	"
(33)	18 June 1954	Guatemalan Cloaked Financial Transactions		"
(34)	21 June 1954	Guatemalan Financial Transactions Relative to Arms Purchases	2	"
(35)	1 July 1954	Subsidiary Financial Data on Guatemalan Arms Deal	2	"

#### DRAFT STATEMENTS

(1)	8 June 1954	Draft Editorial on Non-Aggression Pacts		"
(2)	17 June 1954	Draft Policy Statement on <u>Alfhem</u> Arms Shipment	3	"
(3)	May 1954	Communist Press Reaction to Honduran Strikes	4	"

#### MEMORANDA

(1)	31 July 1953	T/S Special Considerations Regarding the Coffee Industry in Guatemala	5	RQM/OIS (voluntary)
(2)	24 March 1954	Comment on Guatemala Country Plan	4	" "
(3)	29 May 1954	How to subvert the Guatemalan Army Attitudes of Guatemalan Army	8	OO & RQM/OIS "
(4)	1 June 54	Fortuny/Alvarado Monzon	6	RQM "

BIOGRAPHIC REPORTS (Additional Biographic Reports incorporated in Special Studies listed above)

(1) 16 March 1954	Jorge and Guillermo TORIELLO	15	RQM/OIS
(2) 31 May 1954	Minor KEILHAUER and TORIELLO		"
(3) 24 June 1954	Maria VILANOVA de Arbenz	2	"
(4) 2 July 1954	Elfego MONZON	1	"
(5) 2 July 1954	Jose Luis CRUZ Salazar	1	State BI
	Mauricio DUBOIS	1	"

Total 535